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RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS IN PUBLIC
POLITICAL DEBATE
Michael J. Perry*
If few Americans were religious believers, the issue of the proper
role of religion in politics would probably be marginal to American
politics, because religion would be marginal to American politics. But
most Americans are religious believers. Indeed, the citizenry of the
United States is one of the most religious-perhaps even the most
religious-of the citizenries of the world's advanced industrial demo-
cracies. According to recent polling data, "[a]n overwhelming 95%
of Americans profess belief in God";1 moreover, "70% of American
adults [are] members of a church or synagogue."2 If there were,
among the overwhelming majority of Americans who are religious
believers, a consensus about most religious matters-including most
t © 1996 Michael J. Perry. This Essay is drawn from a larger work, Religion in
Politics: Constitutional and Moral Perspectives, that will be published by the Oxford
University Press in 1997. The Author's stylistic and technical conventions have been
preserved in this version.
* Howard J. Trienens Chair in Law at Northwestern University School of Law. For
helpful discussion as I was writing the larger work from which this Essay is drawn, I am
grateful to many friends and colleagues, especially Robert Audi, Thomas Berg, William
Collinge, Daniel Conkle, Charles Curran, Franklin Gamwell, Kent Greenawalt, Stephen
Gardbaum, Scott Idleman, Andrew Koppelman, William Kralovec, Daniel Morrissey, Mark
Noll, John Rawls, Richard Saphire, David Smolin, Lawrence Solum, Laura Underkuffler,
Howard Vogel, Gerry Whyte, and Ashley Woodiwiss. I am also grateful to have had the
opportunity to discuss a draft of the larger work in several venues during the 1995 to 1996
academic year: Wheaton College, Illinois; the Northwestern University Center for the
Humanities; the Saint Thomas University School of Law; the Cumberland School of Law
of Samford University; the University of Colorado School of Law; the University of
California at Davis School of Law; the University of San Diego School of Law; and the
St. John's University School of Law. Finally, I am grateful to the Northwestern University
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1. Richard N. Ostling, In So Many Gods We Trust, TIME, Jan. 30, 1995, at 72, 72.
2. Book Note, Religion and Roe: The Politics of Exclusion, 108 HARV. L. REV. 495,
498 n.21 (1994) (reviewing ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF
VIRTUE: Is ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993)); cf Andrew Greeley, The Persistence of
Religion, CROSS CURRENTS, Spring 1995, at 24.
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religious-moral matters-the issue of the proper role of religion in
politics would probably engage far fewer Americans than it does,
because Americans who are religious believers would not have to fear
being subjected to alien religious tenets. But there is, among
Americans who are religious believers, a dissensus about many fund-
amental religious matters, including many fundamental religious-moral
matters. Because the United States is both such a religious country
and such a religiously pluralistic country (now more than ever), the
issue of the proper role of religion in politics is anything but marginal
to American politics. The proper role of religion in politics is a
central, recurring issue in the politics of the United States.
In the larger work from which this Essay is drawn, I address a
fundamental question about religion in politics: What role may
religious arguments play, if any, either in public debate about what
political choices to make or as a basis of political choice?3 Here I
focus solely on the question about the role religious arguments may
play in public political debate. The controversy about the proper role
of religious arguments in politics comprises two debates: a debate
about the constitutionally proper role of religious arguments in politics
and a related but distinct debate about their morally proper role.4
According to the constitutional law of the United States, government
may not "establish" religion. Given this "nonestablishment" norm,
what role is it constitutionally proper (permissible) for religious argu-
ments to play, if any, in public debate about what political choices to
make?5
First, some clarifications.
- The political choices with which I am principally
concerned in this Essay are those that ban or otherwise dis-
favor one or another sort of human conduct based on the
3. I have pursued aspects of this inquiry before. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND
POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)
[hereinafter PERRY, LOVE AND POWER]. In the years since Love and Power was
published, and partly in response to critical commentary on Love and Power, I have
continued to think about the difficult problem of religion in politics. As it happens, my
thinking has been a rethinking.
4. As a matter of political morality, secular arguments that one or another sort of
human conduct is immoral, as distinct from religious arguments, are not, as such, a
problematic basis of political choice. See Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of Morality,
85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 710 (1995).
5. 1 have presented and defended, elsewhere, a particular construal of the
nonestablishment norm. See Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, and the Constitution, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming Summer 1996).
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view that it is immoral for human beings (whether all human
beings or some human beings) to engage in the conduct. A
law banning abortion is a paradigmatic instance of the kind
of political choice I have in mind; a law banning homosexual
sexual conduct is another.
* The religious arguments with which I am principally
concerned are arguments that one or another sort of human
conduct, like abortion or homosexual sexual conduct, is im-
moral.
* By a "religious" argument, I mean an argument that
relies on (among the other things it relies on) a religious
belief: an argument that presupposes the truth of a religious
belief and includes that belief as one of its essential premis-
es. A "religious" belief is, for present purposes, either the
belief that God exists-"God" in the sense of a transcendent
reality that is the source, the ground, and the end of
everything else-or a belief about the nature, the activity, or
the will of God.6 A belief can be "nonreligious," then, in
one of two senses. The belief that God does not exist is
nonreligious in the sense of "atheistic." A belief that is
about something other than God's existence or nonexistence,
nature, activity, or will is nonreligious in the sense of
"secular." In addition to religious arguments, we can
imagine "atheistic" arguments (arguments that rely on the
belief that God does not exist) and "secular" arguments:
arguments that rely only on secular beliefs. One who is
"agnostic" about the existence of God-who neither believes
nor disbelieves that God exists-will find only secular argu-
ments persuasive.7
6. Although some Buddhist sects are theistic, Buddhism-unlike Christianity, for
example-is predominantly nontheistic, in the sense that Buddhism does not affirm the
meaningfulness of "God"-talk. Nonetheless, Buddhism does seem to affirm the existence
of a transcendent reality that is the source, the ground, and the end of everything else.
For example, see The Emptying God A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation and in
particular David Tracy's reflections on Masao Abe's writings. David Tracy, Kenosis,
Sunyata, and Trinity: A Dialogue with Masao Abe, in THE EMPTYING GOD: A
BUDDHIST-JEWISH-CHRISTIAN CONVERSATION 135 (John B. Cobb, Jr. & Christopher Ives
eds., 1990).
7. My position, in this section, about the constitutionally permissible role of religion
in politics-like my position in the rest of this Essay about the morally proper role of
religion in politics-is meant to apply to atheistic arguments as well as to religious ones:
arguments that presuppose the truth of and include as one of their essential elements the
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I. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Let's begin with this question: Does a legislator or other public
official,' or even a citizen (i.e., a citizen who is not a legislator or
other public official) violate the nonestablishment norm by presenting
a religious argument in public political debate? For example, does a
legislator violate the nonestablishment norm by presenting, in public
debate about whether the law should recognize homosexual marriage,
a religious argument that homosexual sexual conduct is immoral? An
affirmative answer is wildly implausible. Every citizen, without regard
to whether she is a legislator or other public official,9 is constitution-
ally free to present in public political debate whatever arguments
about morality, including whatever religious arguments, she wants to
present.'0 Indeed, the freedom of speech protected by the constitu-
tional law of the United States is so generous that it extends even to
arguments, including secular arguments, that may not, as a constitu-
tional matter, serve as a basis of political choice-for example, the
argument that persons of nonwhite ancestry are not truly or fully
human (which is an unconstitutional basis of political choice under the
antidiscrimination part of the Fourteenth Amendment).' Thus,
belief that God does not exist. In a society that, like the United States, is overwhelmingly
religious, it would not be acceptable to deprivilege religious arguments relative to atheistic
ones. As Kent Greenawalt has cautioned, "one must present reasons for [the proposed
principle of restraint] that have appeal to persons of religious and ethical views different
from one's own." Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for Political Judgment: The Status of
Personal Experience and the Autonomy and Generality of Principles of Restraint, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 647, 672 (1993); cf KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND
PUBLIC REASONS 63 (1988) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES]
("assum[ing] that a principle of restraint against reliance on religious grounds would also
bar reliance on antireligious grounds").
8. By "other public official" I mean, here and elsewhere in this Essay, principally the
policy making officials in the executive branch of government. The chief policy-making
official in the executive branch of the national government is, of course, the President of
the United States; the chief policy-making official in the executive branch of a state
government is the governor of the state.
9. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious
Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 604 n.83 (1995);
cf McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
10. The Supreme Court recently remarked that "in Anglo-American history, at least,
government suppression of speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious
speech that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince."
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2446 (1995).
11. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS?
143-49 (1994) [hereinafter PERRY, CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS].
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whether or not religious arguments may, as a constitutional matter,
serve as a basis of political choice-and, so, even if they may not
serve as a basis of political choice-it is clear that citizens and even
legislators and other public officials are constitutionally free to present
such arguments in public political debate. 2 The nonestablishment
norm is not to the contrary.
Moreover, to disfavor religious arguments relative to secular ones
would be to violate the core meaning-the antidiscrimination
meaning-of the free exercise norm. After all, included among the
religious practices protected by the free exercise norm are bearing
public witness to one's religious beliefs and trying to influence
political decision making on the basis of those beliefs.13 As the
Second Vatican Council of the Catholic Church observed in the
document Dignitatis Humanae, true freedom of religion includes the
freedom of persons and groups "'to show the special value of their
doctrine in what concerns the organization of society and the inspir-
ation of the whole of human activity."" 4 Although the nonestablish-
ment norm, as I have explained, forbids any branch or agency of
government to do certain sorts of things, to engage in certain sorts of
actions, it does not forbid any person-including any person who
happens to be a legislator or other public official-to say whatever
she wants to say, religious or not, in public political debate. The
serious question, then, is not whether legislators or other public
officials, much less citizens, violate the nonestablishment norm by
presenting religious arguments in public political debate." The
12. This is not to deny that as a constitutional matter government may require as a
condition of continued employment that some of its employees (for example, members of
the police force) refrain from saying some things in public that they are constitutionally
free to say (for example, "blacks aren't human").
13. See, e.g., PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), GOD ALONE is LORD OF THE CON-
SCIENCE: POLICY STATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 48 (1989): "[I]t is a limitation and denial of faith not to seek its expression in
both a personal and a public manner, in such ways as will not only influence but transform
the social order. Faith demands engagement in the secular order and involvement in the
political realm."
14. David Hollenbach, S.J., A Communitarian Reconstruction of Human Rights:
Contributions from Catholic Tradition, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM 127, 142 (R.
Bruce Douglass & David Hollenbach, S.J. eds., 1994) (quoting Dignitatis Humanae, nos.
2 and 4.)
15. Of course, presenting religious arguments in nonpublic political debate-political
debate around the kitchen table, for example, or at a meeting of the local parish's Peace
and Justice Committee-is not constitutionally problematic. A practical problem with the
position that presenting religious arguments in public political debate is constitutionally
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serious question, rather, is whether government would violate the
nonestablishment norm by basing a political choice-for example, a
law banning abortion-on a religious argument. 6 In the larger work
from which this Essay is drawn, I argue under the nonestablishment
norm, government may not make a political choice about the morality
of human conduct unless a plausible secular rationale supports the
choice.
1 7
Constitutional legality does not entail moral propriety: that an
act would not violate any constitutional norm does not entail that the
act would be, all things considered, morally appropriate. Beyond
the constitutional inquiry, therefore, lies the moral inquiry. I have
explained that citizens and even legislators and other public officials
are constitutionally free to present religious arguments, including
religious arguments about the morality of human conduct, in public
problematic is that it may sometimes be difficult to say when "nonpublic" political debate
has crossed the line and become "public.'' But that practical problem is also an academic
one, because, as I have explained, presenting religious arguments in public political debate
is not constitutionally problematic. For an argument that the nonestablishment norm
forbids legislators to present religious arguments in public political debate, see Abner S.
Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE LJ. 1611 (1993). 1 concur
in Scott Idleman's rejection of Greene's position, see Scott C. Idleman, Ideology as
Interpretation: A Reply to Professor Greene's Theory of the Religion Clauses, 1994 U. ILL.
L. REV. 337. For Greene's response, see Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special?: A
Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 535.
16. I explain below why even one who opposes government basing political choices
on religious arguments need not, and indeed should not, oppose legislators or other public
officials, much less citizens, presenting religious arguments about the morality of human
conduct in public political debate. See infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
17. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS:, CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL
PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS].
18. Similarly, constitutional illegality does not entail moral impropriety; that an act
would violate a constitutional norm does not entail that the act would be, apart from its
unconstitutionality, morally inappropriate. Even taking into account its unconstitutionality,
an act may not be, all things considered, morally inappropriate. While relevant to an
assessment of the morality of an act, that an act is unconstitutional does not by itself entail
the immorality of the act. After all, one can imagine a constitution that forbids that which
is morally required, or requires that which is morally forbidden. Indeed, if we conclude
that an act that would violate a constitutional norm would not be, apart from its unconsti-
tutionality, morally inappropriate-and especially if we conclude that the act would be
morally appropriate-we can proceed to inquire whether the constitutional law of the
United States should not be revised by the Supreme Court, or even amended pursuant to
Article V of the Constitution, to permit the act.
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political debate. The question remains, however, whether, all things
considered, it is not morally inappropriate for citizens and especially
legislators and other public officials to present such arguments in
public political debate. I now turn to that question. 9
II. POLITICAL MORALITY
I have concluded here that citizens and even legislators and other
public officials are constitutionally free to present religious arguments,
including religious arguments about the morality of human conduct,
in public debate about what political choices to make. (To repeat, the
political choices with which I am principally concerned in this forth-
coming book are political choices about the morality of human
conduct: choices to ban or otherwise disfavor one or another sort of
human conduct on the basis of the view that it is immoral for human
beings, whether all or some, to engage in the conduct.) I now explain
why, as a matter not just of constitutionality but of poitic.l morality
too, citizens and even legislators and other public officials may
present, in public political debate, religious arguments about the
morality of human conduct. Indeed, I conclude that it is important
that such religious arguments, no less than secular arguments about
the morality of human conduct, be presented in public political
debate. It bears emphasis that the inquiry I pursue in this Essay,
about the role of religious arguments in-public political debate, is
about political morality, not political strategy.
[T]he distinction between principle and prudence should be
emphasized. The fundamental question is not whether, as a
19. According to the construal of the nonestablishment norm I have defended
elsewhere, see PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITIcs, supra note 17, government may rely on a
religious argument in making a political choice about the morality of human conduct only
if a plausible secular rationale supports the choice. The question remains, however,
whether, all things 'considered, it is not morally inappropriate for legislators and other
public officials, and for citizens voting in a referendum election, to rely on a religious
argument in making a political choice about the morality of human conduct even if a
plausible secular rationale--or even, in their view, a persuasive secular rationale-supports
the choice. (Those with the principal policy making authority and responsibility-in partic-
ular, legislators-should ask themselves whether they find a secular rationale persuasive.)
From the other side, the question remains whether, apart from the nonestablishment norm,
it is not morally permissible for legislators and others to rely on a religious argument in
making a political choice about the morality of human conduct even if, in their view, no
persuasive or even plausible secular rationale supports the choice. I address those ques-
tions-questions not of constitutionality but of political morality-in the larger work from
which this Essay is drawn, see id.
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matter of prudent judgment in a religiously pluralist society,
those who hold particular religious views ought to cast their
arguments in secular terms. Even an outsider can say that
the answer to that question is clearly, "Yes, most of the
time," for only such a course is likely to be successful over-
all.2°
It is inevitable that some legislators, and some citizens participat-
ing in a referendum election, will rely on-will put at least some
weight on-religious arguments in voting for political choices about
the morality of human conduct. Moreover, a religious argument can
be quite influential in moving a critical mass of legislators or citizens
to want to make a particular political choice and in inclining them to
accept, as a rationale for the choice, a secular argument that supports
the choice. For example, a biblically based argument that homosexual
sexual conduct is immoral has moved some citizens and legislators to
want to deny legal recognition to homosexual marriage and has
inclined some of them to accept, as a secular rationale for their
position, the argument that homosexuality, like alcoholism, is
pathological and ought not to be indulged, or the argument that
recognizing homosexual marriage would threaten the institution of
heterosexual marriage and other "traditional family values." Because
of the role that religiously based moral arguments inevitably play in
the political process, then, it is important that such arguments, no less
than secular moral arguments, be presented in, so that they can be
tested in, public political debate. Ideally, such arguments will some-
times be tested, in the to and fro of public political debate, by
competing scripture- or tradition-based religious arguments. Luke
Timothy Johnson's warning is relevant here:
If liberal Christians committed to sexual equality and relig-
ious tolerance abandon these texts as useless, they also
abandon the field of Christian hermeneutics to those whose
fearful and-it must be said-sometimes hate-filled appre-
hension of Christianity will lead them to exploit and empha-
size just those elements of the tradition that have proven
harmful to humans. If what Phyllis Trible has perceptively
termed "texts of terror" within the Bible are not encoun-
tered publicly and engaged intellectually by a hermeneutics
20. Mark Tushnet, The Limits of the Involvement of Religion in the Body Politic, in
THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 191,213 (James E. Wood,
Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1991).
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that is at once faithful and critical, then they will continue to
exercise their potential for harm among those who, without
challenge, can claim scriptural authority for their own dark
impulses.2'
Nonetheless, some persons want to keep religiously based moral
arguments out of public political debate as much as possible. For
example, the American philosopher Richard Rorty has written
approvingly of "privatizing religion-keeping it out of.. . 'the public
square,' making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of
public policy."' One reason for wanting to "privatize" religion is
that religious debates about controversial political issues can be quite
divisive. But American history does not suggest that religious debates
about controversial issues-racial discrimination, for example, or
war-are invariably more divisive than secular debates about those or
other issues.' Some issues are so controversial that debate about
them is inevitably divisive without regard to whether the debate is
partly religious or, instead, only secular.24
Another reason for wanting to keep religiously based moral argu-
ments out of public political debate focuses on the inability of some
persons to gain a critical distance on their religious beliefs-the kind
of critical distance essential to truly deliberative debate. But in the
United States and in other liberal democracies, many persons are able
21. Luke Timothy Johnson, Religious Rights and Christian Texts, in RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTs IN GLOBAL PERSPECIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 65, 72-73 (John
Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996) (footnote omitted).
22. Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, 3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1, 2
(1994).
23. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 405, 413: "Religious differences in this country have never generated the civil
discord experienced in political conflicts over such issues as the Vietnam War, racial
segregation, the Red Scare, unionization, or slavery."
24. Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
That public debate of religious ideas, like any other, may arouse emotion, may
incite, may foment religious divisiveness and strife does not rob it of constitution-
al protection.... The mere fact that a purpose of the Establishment Clause is
to reduce or eliminate religious divisiveness or strife, does not place religious
discussion, association, or political participation in a status less preferred than
rights of discussion, association and political participation generally...
The State's goal of preventing sectarian bickering and strife may not be
accomplished by regulating religious speech and political association....
•.. [G]overnment may not as a goal promote "safe thinking" with respect
to religion .... The Establishment Clause, properly understood, ... may not
be used as a sword to justify repression of religion or its adherents from any
aspect of public life.
Id at 640-41 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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to gain a critical distance on their religious beliefs; they are cer-
tainly as able to do so as they and others are able to gain a critical
distance on other fundamental beliefs.26  David Tracy speaks for
many of us religious believers when he writes:
For believers to be unable to learn from secular feminists on
the patriarchal nature of most religions or to be unwilling to
be challenged by Feuerbach, Darwin, Marx, Freud, or
Nietzsche is to refuse to take seriously the religion's own
suspicions on the existence of those fundamental distortions
named sin, ignorance, or illusion. The interpretations of
believers will, of course, be grounded in some fundamental
trust in, and loyalty to, the Ultimate Reality both disclosed
and concealed in one's own religious tradition. But funda-
mental trust, as any experience of friendship can teach, is
not immune to either criticism or suspicion. A religious
person will ordinarily fashion some hermeneutics of trust,
even one of friendship and love, for the religious classics of
her or his tradition. But, as any genuine understanding of
friendship shows, friendship often demands both critique and
suspicion. A belief in a pure and innocent love is one of the
less happy inventions of the romantics. A friendship that
never includes critique and even, when appropriate, suspi-
cion is a friendship barely removed from the polite and wary
communication of strangers. As Buber showed, in every
I-thou encounter, however transient, we encounter some new
dimension of reality. But if that encounter is to prove more
than transitory, the difficult ways of friendship need a trust
powerful enough to risk itself in critique and suspicion. To
claim that this may be true of all our other loves but not
true of our love for, and trust in, our religious tradition
25. Cf. Daniel 0. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role
of Competing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 1
(1993-1994).
26. To his credit, Richard Rorty insists that there is "hypocrisy... in saying that
believers somehow have no right to base their political views on their religious faith,
whereas we atheists have every right to base ours on Enlightenment philosophy. The
claim that in doing so we are appealing to reason, whereas the religious are being
irrational, is hokum." Rorty, supra note 22, at 4.
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makes very little sense either hermeneutically or religious-
ly.2
7
Of course, it is undeniable that some religious believers are unable to
gain much if any critical distance on their fundamental religious
beliefs. As so much in the twentieth century attests, however, one
need not be a religious believer to adhere to one's fundamental
beliefs with close-minded or even fanatical tenacity.
Although no one who has lived through recent American history
can believe that religious contributions to the public discussion of
difficult moral issues are invariably deliberative rather than dogmatic,
there is no reason to believe that religious contributions are never
deliberative. Religious discourse about the difficult moral issues that
engage and divide us citizens of liberal democratic societies is not
necessarily more problematic-more monologic, say-than resolutely
secular discourse about those issues. Because of the religious
illiteracy-and, alas, even prejudice-rampant among many nonreli-
gious intellectuals,' we probably need reminding that, at its best,
religious discourse in public culture is not less dialogic-it is notless
openminded and deliberative-than is, at its best, secular discourse in
public culture. (Nor, at its worst, is religious discourse more mono-
logic-more closerninded and dogmatic-than is, at its worst, secular
discourse.)29 David Hollenbach's work has developed this important
point:
27. DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE
112 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
28. As David Tracy has written, religion is
the single subject about which many intellectuals can feel free to be ignorant.
Often abetted by the churches, they need not study religion, for "everybody"
already knows what religion is: It is a private consumer product that some
people seem to need. Its former social role was poisonous. Its present
privatization is harmless enough to wish it well from a civilized distance.
Religion seems to be the sort of thing one likes "if that's the sort of thing one
likes."
DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION 13 (1981); see also KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 6 (1988) ("A good many professors and
other intellectuals display a hostility or skeptical indifference to religion that amounts to
a thinly disguised contempt for belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by scientific
inquiry and ordinary human experience."); cf Special Issue-Religion & the Media: Three
Forums, COMMONWEAL, Feb. 24, 1995.
29. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE, 159
(1988) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICIONS]: "[I]f the worry is
openmindedness and sensitivity to publicly accessible reasons, drawing a sharp distinction
between religious convictions and [secular] personal bases [of judgment] would be an
extremely crude tool." David Tracy has lamented that
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Much discussion of the public role of religion in recent
political thought presupposes that religion is more likely to
fan the flames of discord than to contribute to social
concord. This is certainly true of some forms of religious
belief, but hardly of all. Many religious communities
recognize that their traditions are dynamic and that their
understandings of God are not identical with the reality of
God. Such communities have in the past and can in the
future engage in the religious equivalent of intellectual solid-
arity, often called ecumenical or interreligious dialogue."
[flor however often the word is bandied about, dialogue remains a rare pheno-
menon in anyone's experience. Dialogue demands the intellectual, moral, and,
at the limit, religious ability to struggle to hear another and to respond. To
respond critically, and even suspiciously when necessary, but to respond only in
dialogical relationship to a real, not a projected other.
David Tracy, DIALOGUE WITH THE OTHER 4 (1990). Steven Smith, commenting wryly
that "'dialogue' seems to have become the all-purpose elixir of our time," has suggested
that "[t]he hard question is not whether people should talk, but rather what they should
say and what (among the various ideas communicated) they should believe." Steven D.
Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 434-35 (1990). As Tracy's obser-
vation suggests, however, there is yet another "hard" question, which Smith's suggestion
tends to obscure: Not whether but how people should talk; what qualities of character and
mind should they bring, or try to bring, to the task.
30. David Hollenbach, S.J., Civil Society: Beyond the Public-Private Dichotomy,
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY Winter 1994-1995 at 15, 22 [hereinafter Hollenbach, Civil
Society]. One of the religious communities to which Hollenbach refers is the Catholic
community. See David Hollenbach, S.J., Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil
Society and Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 891 (1993) [hereinafter Hollenbach,
Contexts of the Political Role]:
For example, the Catholic tradition provides some noteworthy evidence that
discourse across the boundaries of diverse communities is both possible and
potentially fruitful when it is pursued seriously. This tradition, in its better
moments, has experienced considerable success in efforts to bridge the divisions
that have separated it from other communities with other understandings of the
good life. In the first and second centuries, the early Christian community
moved from being a small Palestinian sect to active encounter with the Hellen-
istic and Roman worlds. In the fourth century, Augustine brought biblical faith
into dialogue with Stoic and Neoplatonic thought. His efforts profoundly
transformed both Christian and Graeco-Roman thought and practice. In the
thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas once again transformed Western Christiani-
ty by appropriating ideas from Aristotle that he had learned from Arab Muslims
and from Jews. In the process he also transformed Aristotelian ways of thinking
in fundamental ways. Not the least important of these transformations was his
insistence that the political life of a people is not the highest realization of the
good of which they are capable-an insight that lies at the root of constitutional
theories of limited government. And though the Church resisted the liberal
discovery of modem freedoms through much of the modem period, liberalism
has been transforming Catholicism once again through the last half of our own
century. The memory of these events in social and intellectual history as well
as the experience of the Catholic Church since the Second Vatican Council leads
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A central feature of Hollenbach's work is his argument, which I
accept, that the proper role of "public" religious discourse in a society
as religiously pluralistic as the United States is a role to be played, in
the main, much more in public culture-in particular, "in those
components of civil society that are the primary bearers of cultural
meaning and value-universities, religious communities, the world of
the arts, and serious journalism"-than in public debate specifically
about political issues.3' He writes: "[T]he domains of government
and policy-formation are not generally the appropriate ones in which
to argue controverted theological and philosophical issues." But,
as Hollenbach goes on to acknowledge, "it is nevertheless neither
possible nor desirable to construct an airtight barrier between politics
and culture."3  There is, then, in addition to the reasons I have
already given, this important reason for not opposing the presentation
of religiously based moral arguments in public political debate: In a
society as overwhelmingly religious as the United States, we do
present and discuss-and we should present and discuss-religiously
based moral arguments in our public culture.34 Rather than try to
me to hope that communities holding different visions of the good life can get
somewhere if they are willing to risk conversation and argument about these
visions. Injecting such hope back into the public life of the United States would
be a signal achievement. Today, it appears to be not only desirable but
necessary.
See also id. at 892-96.
31. See Hollenbach, Civil Society, supra note 30, at 22.
Conversation and argument about the common good [including religious conver-
sation and argument] will not occur initially in the legislature or in the political
sphere (narrowly conceived as the domain in which conflict of interest and power
are adjudicated). Rather it will develop freely in those components of civil
society that are the primary bearers of cultural meaning and value-universities,
religious communities, the world of the arts, and serious journalism. It can occur
wherever thoughtful men and women bring their beliefs on the meaning of the
good life into intelligent and critical encounter with understandings of this good
held by other peoples with other traditions. In short, it occurs wherever educa-
tion about and serious inquiry into the meaning of the good life takes place.
Id.
32. Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role, supra note 30, at 900; see also Kent
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further Reflections, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 1019, 1034 (1990) (expressing skepticism about "the promise of religious
perspectives being transformed in what is primarily political debate").
33. Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role, supra note 30, at 900.
34. Cf. Paul G. Stern, A Pluralistic Reading of the First Amendment and Its Relation
to Public Discourse, 99 YALE LJ. 925, 934 (1990):
[W]e can freely and intelligently exercise our freedom of choice on fundamental
matters having to do with our own individual ideals and conceptions of the good
only if we have access to an unconstrained discussion in which the merits of
competing moral, religious, aesthetic, and philosophical values are given a fair
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do the impossible-maintain a wall of separation ("an airtight
barrier") between the religiously based moral discourse that inevitably
and properly takes place in public culture ("universities, religious
communities, the world of the arts, and serious journalism") on the
one side and the discourse that takes place in public political debate
("the domains of government and policy-formation") on the other
side-we should simply welcome the presentation of religiously based
moral arguments in all areas of our public culture, including public
debate specifically about contested political choices?5 Indeed, for
the reasons I have given, we should not merely welcome but
encourage the presentation of such arguments in public political
debate-so that we can test them there. To be sure, religious
discourse in public-whether in public political debate or in other
parts of our public culture-is sometimes quite sectarian and,
therefore, divisive. But religiously based moral discourse is not
necessarily more sectarian than secular moral discourse. It can be
much less sectarian. After all, certain basic moral premises common
to the Jewish and Christian traditions, in conjunction with the
supporting religious premises, still constitute the fundamental moral
horizon of most Americans-much more so than do Kantian (or
neoKantian) premises, or Millian premises, or Nietzschean premises,
and so forth. 6 According to John Coleman, "the tradition of biblical
opportunity for hearing.
35. No one suggests that presenting religious arguments in nonpublic political de-
bate-political debate around the kitchen table, for example, or at a meeting of the local
parish's Peace and Justice Committee-is morally problematic. A practical problem with
the position that presenting religious arguments in public political debate is morally
problematic is that it may sometimes be difficult to say when nonpublic political debate
has crossed the line and become public. Moreover, it is no more possible to maintain "an
airtight barrier" between the religiously based moral discourse that takes place in non-
public political debate and that which takes place in public political debate than it is to
maintain an airtight barrier between the religiously based moral discourse that takes place
in "universities, religious communities, the world of the arts, and serious journalism" and
that which takes place in "the domains of government and policy-formation." Why not,
then, just welcome the presentation of religiously based moral arguments in public as well
as in relatively nonpublic political debate?
36. The following statement by Jtlrgen Habermas is noteworthy here:
I do not believe that we, as Europeans, can seriously understand concepts like
morality and ethical life, person and individuality, or freedom and emancipation,
without appropriating the substance of the Judeo-Christian understanding of
history in terms of salvation. And these concepts are, perhaps, nearer to our
hearts than the conceptual resources of Platonic thought, centering on order and
revolving around the cathartic intuition of ideas. Others begin from other
traditions to find the way to the plenitude of meaning involved in concepts such
as these, which structure our self-understanding. But without the transmission
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religion is arguably the most powerful and pervasive symbolic
resource" for a public ethics in the United States today.3 7 "[O]ur
tradition of religious ethics seems.., to enjoy a more obvious public
vigor and availability as a resource for renewal in American culture
than either the tradition of classic republican theory or the American
tradition of public philosophy."38  Coleman reminds us that "the
strongest American voices for a compassionate just community always
appealed in public to religious imagery and sentiments, from
Winthrop and Sam Adams, Melville and the Lincoln of the second
inaugural address, to Walter Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr
and Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King."39 As Coleman
explains, "The American religious ethic and rhetoric contain rich,
polyvalent symbolic power to command commitments of emotional
depth, when compared to 'secular' language, ... [which] remains
exceedingly 'thin' as a symbol system."'  Coleman emphasizes that
"when used as a public discourse, the language of biblical religion is
beyond the control of any particular, denominational theology. It
represents a common American cultural patrimony.... American
public theology or religious ethics... cannot be purely sectarian. The
biblical language belongs to no one church, denomination, or sect."'"
In Coleman's view,
The genius of public American theology ... is that it has
transcended denominations, been espoused by people as
diverse as Abraham Lincoln and Robert Bellah who neither
were professional theologians nor belonged to any specific
church and, even in the work of specifically trained profes-
sional theologians, such as Reinhold Neibuhr, has appealed
less to revelational warrant for its authority within public
policy discussions than to the ability of biblical insights and
symbols to convey a deeper human wisdom. ... Biblical
through socialization and the transformation through philosophy of any one of
the great world religions, this semantic potential could one day become inacces-
sible. If the remnant of the intersubjectively shared self-understanding that
makes human(e) intercourse with one another possible is not to disintegrate, this
potential must be mastered anew by every generation.
JORGEN HABERMAS, POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 15
(William M. Hohengarte trans., 1992).
37. JOHN A. COLEMAN, S.J., AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THEOLOGY 192 (1982).
38. Id
39. AL at 193.
40.. laI
41. Id at 194.
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imagery ... lies at the heart of the American self-under-
standing. It is neither parochial nor extrinsic.
42
So, religiously based moral discourse is not always more sectarian
than secular moral discourse; it can be less sectarian. But even if
religiously based moral discourse were invariably more sectarian than
secular moral discourse, this important point would remain: Sectarian
discourse, including sectarian religious discourse, can make a worth-
while contribution to public deliberation about difficult moral issues.
As Jeremy Waldron has explained:
Even if people are exposed in argument to ideas over
which they are bound to disagree-and how could any
doctrine of public deliberation preclude that?-it does not
follow that such exposure is pointless or oppressive. For one
thing, it is important for people to be acquainted with the
42. Id. at 194-95. Coleman adds: "I am further strongly convinced that the Enlighten-
ment desire for an unmediated universal fraternity and language (resting as it did on
unreflected allegiance to very particular communities and language, conditioned by time
and culture) was destructive of the lesser, real 'fraternities'-in [Wilson Carey]
McWilliams' sense-in American life." Id. at 194; cf John A. Coleman, S.J., A Possible
Role for Biblical Religion in Public Life, in Theology and Philosophy in Public: A
Symposium on John Courtney Murray's Unfinished Agenda, 40 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 701,
704 (David Hollenbach, S.J. ed., 1979):
American Catholic social thought in general and [John Courtney] Murray in
particular appealed generously to the American liberal tradition of public
philosophy and the classic understanding of republican virtue embedded in the
medieval synthesis. Curiously, however, they were very sparing in invoking
biblical religion and the prophetic tradition in their efforts to address issues of
public policy.
There are two reasons for this Catholic reluctance to evoke biblical imagery in public
discourse. Much of the public religious rhetoric for American self-understanding was
couched in a particularist Protestant form which excluded a more generously pluralistic
understanding of America. Perhaps one reason why American Catholics and Jews have
never conceived of the American proposition as a covenant-even a broken one-is
because Protestant covenant thought tended in practice to exclude the new immigrants.
Hence, for American Catholics as for Jews, more "secular" Enlightenment forms and
traditions promised inclusion and legitimacy in ways Protestant evangelical imagery fore-
closed. As Murray states, "the Protestant identification with America led to 'Nativism in
all its manifold forms, ugly and refined, popular and academic, fanatic and liberal. The
neoNativist as well as the paleo-Nativist addresses to the Catholic substantially the same
charge: "You are among us but not of us.' ... Id. Murray made no religious claims for
the founding act of America as such. Catholics, decidedly, were not here in force when
the Puritans and their God made a covenant with the land. Nor were they ever conspic-
uously invited to join the covenant. They preferred, therefore, a less religious, more civil
understanding of America. The second reason for a Catholic predilection for the two
traditions of republican theory and liberal philosophy is the Catholic recognition of the
need for a secular warrant for social claims in a pluralist society. This penchant is rooted
in Catholic natural-law thought.
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views that others hold. Even more important, however, is
the possibility that my own view may be improved, in its
subtlety and depth, by exposure to a religion or a metaphys-
ics that I am initially inclined to reject.... I mean to draw
attention to an experience we all have had at one time or
another, of having argued with someone whose world view
was quite at odds with our own, and of having come away
thinking, "I'm sure he's wrong, and I can't follow much of it,
but, still, it makes you think ...." The prospect of losing
that sort of effect in public discourse is, frankly, frighten-
ing-terrifying, even, if we are to imagine it being replaced
by a form of "deliberation" that, in the name of "fairness"
or "reasonableness" (or worse still, "balance") consists of
bland appeals to harmless nostrums that are accepted with-
out question on all sides. This is to imagine open-ended
public debate reduced to the formal trivia of American tele-
vision networks.
... [This] might apply to any religious or other philo-
sophically contentious intervention. We do not have (and
we should not have) so secure a notion of public consensus,
or such stringent requirements of fairness in debate, as to
exclude any view from having its effect in the marketplace
of ideas.43
Again, Richard Rorty thinks that it makes sense to "privatiz[e]
religion-[to] keep[] it out of... 'the public square,' making it seem
bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy."" Rorty
should think again. Not only are the reasons for wanting to privatize
religion weak, there are strong countervailing reasons, which I have
given in this section, for wanting to "public-ize" religion, not privatize
it. We should welcome religiously based moral arguments into the
public square (where we can then test them), not try to keep them
43. Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 817, 841-42 (1993); cf. Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1765, 1794 (1994):
It is always possible that learning more about a moral or religious doctrine will
lead us to like it less. But the respect of deliberation and engagement affords
a more spacious public reason than liberalism allows. It is also a more suitable
ideal for a pluralist society. To the extent that our moral and religious disagree-
ments reflect the ultimate plurality of human goods, a deliberative mode of
respect will better enable us to appreciate the distinctive goods our different lives
express.
44. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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out. We should make it seem distasteful to sneer when people bring
their religious convictions to bear in public discussions of controversial
political issues, like homosexuality and abortion. It is not that
religious convictions are brought to bear in public political debate that
should worry us, but how they are sometimes brought to bear (e.g.,
dogmatically). But we should be no less worried about how funda-
mental secular convictions are sometimes brought to bear in public
political debate.'
III. GREENAWALT ON RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS IN
PUBLIC POLITICAL DEBATE
Kent Greenawalt is one of the most thoughtful contributors to
the debate about the morally proper role of religion in politics. By
way of defending the position I have been presenting in this Essay, I
want to explain why I disagree with Greenawalt's position that legis-
lators should not present religious arguments in public political
debate.4 6 (Greenawalt writes: "I concentrate on legislators, assum-
45. As I have explained in the larger work from which this Essay is drawn, I am in
substantial agreement with the position that, in Kathleen Sullivan's formulation, "the
negative bar against establishment of religion implies the affirmative 'establishment' of a
civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes.. . . [P]ublic moral disputes may be
resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and
Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 197 (1992). However, Sullivan is wrong to
suggest that the fact that government may not make political choices in the absence of a
plausible secular rationale constitutes "the banishment of religion from the public square."
Id. at 222. First, "the public square"-the public culture of a society-includes much more
than politics. To banish religion from politics is not to banish it from the rest of public
culture. Second, religion has not been banished even from politics (much less from the
rest of public culture): As I have explained, it is neither constitutionally nor morally
inappropriate for legislators or other public officials, much less citizens, to present
religiously based arguments about the morality of human conduct in public political
debate. Indeed, because of the role that such religious arguments inevitably play in the
political process, it is important that such arguments, no less than secular moral arguments,
be presented in-so that they can be tested in-public political debate.
46. Greenawalt defends his position in a recent book, GREENAWALT, PRIVATE
CONSCIENCES, supra note 7. Greenawalt emphasizes that his position on the morally
proper role of religion in politics is designed not for every liberal democratic society but
for a particular one: the United States. Greenawalt understands that the precise arrange-
ment between religion and politics that makes the most sense for the United States, given
its history and traditions, political culture, and present circumstances, may not make the
most sense for another liberal democratic society with a relevantly different history,
political culture, etc. Moreover, Greenawalt's principal aim is not to recommend an
arrangement that the law should impose, but only principles of self-restraint: principles,
an arrangement, that citizens and legislators and other public officials should impose on
themselves. Put another way, Greenawalt's aim is to recommend an informal (nonlegal)
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ing that chief executives [the President of the United States and state
governors] should be governed by similar standards." 47 ) In the
preceding section, I explained why we should encourage the airing of
religious arguments, even by legislators, in public political debate.
Now I want to explain why Greenawalt's reasons for asking legislators
to avoid presenting such arguments in public political debate do not
bear the weight he puts on them.
Greenawalt's rationale is twofold. Greenawalt's first and
principal reason is that if a legislator presents a religious argument in
public political debate, some of those the legislator represents "are
likely to feel imposed upon in the sense of being excluded. 48
Greenawalt is concerned about "the inequality and disrespect that
members of minorities may feel..., the sense they may have that
they are being imposed upon as second class citizens."'49 In my view,
this reason will not bear the weight Greenawalt puts on it. Unless my
representative and I are clones, there will almost certainly be some
occasions, perhaps many, on which she and I are in fundamental dis-
agreement. Why should I feel significantly more imposed upon, if
imposed upon at all, if our disagreement is rooted in religious differ-
ences than if it is rooted in secular differences? In a different but
related context, Steven Smith has written something that is relevant
here-and I concur in it:
[T]he very concept of "alienation," or symbolic exclusion, is
difficult to grasp.... How, if at all, does "alienation" differ
from "anger," "annoyance," "frustration," or "disappoint-
ment" that every person who finds himself in a political
minority is likely to feel? "Alienation" might refer to
nothing more than an awareness by an individual that she
belongs to a religious minority, accompanied by the realiza-
tion that at least on some kinds of issues she is unlikely to
arrangement for the United States; it is to recommend that a certain understanding, that
certain expectations, be established (or, if already established, maintained) in American
political culture. Greenawalt understands that even if the law does not and should not
forbid (or require) an activity, there may nonetheless be good reasons for persons not to
engage (or to engage) in the activity. There is much in Greenawalt's thoughtful book with
which I am in substantial agreement and on which I do not comment here. In particular,
I concur in most of Greenawalt's balanced but critical comments on the positions of
several other contributors to the debate about religion in politics.
47. Id at 156.
48. Id at 157.
49. Id at 132.
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be able to prevail in the political process. ... That aware-
ness may be discomforting. But is it the sort of phenomenon
for which constitutional law can provide an efficacious
remedy? Constitutional doctrine that stifles the message will
not likely alter the reality-or a minority's awareness of that
reality.
50
Continuing to develop his first reason, Greenawalt writes:
[A]t least for many religious arguments, the speaker seems
to put himself or herself in a kind of privileged position, as
the holder of a basic truth that many others lack. This
assertion of privileged knowledge may appear to imply
inequality of status that is in serious tension with the fund-
amental idea of equality of citizens within liberal democra-
cies.
5 '
It is true for many secular arguments, too, however, that the speaker
seems to portray herself as the holder of basic truths or insights that
many others lack-for example, basic truths about human nature or
about the workings of society. In any event, I fail to see how such an
"assertion of privileged knowledge" is in any way inconsistent with
the fundamental idea of the equality of all citizens. This idea of
equality is really two, related ideas:
9 The idea of the moral equality of all persons: Every
person, without regard to "race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status,"5" is sacred.
* The idea of the political equality of all citizens!
Because every person is sacred, every citizen is sacred, and
therefore every citizen, without regard to race, sex, religion,
etc., is entitled to participate in the politics and government
of his or her society on an equal basis with every other
citizen; moreover, no citizen may be treated with less respect
or concern than any other citizen.
50. STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTION-
AL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 164-65 n.66 (1995). Smith quotes Mark Tushnet:
"[Nionadherents who believe that they are excluded from the political community are
merely expressing the disappointment felt by everyone who has lost a fair fight in the
arena of politics." Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701,712
(1986).
51. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 7, at 157.
52. This is the antidiscrimination language of Article 2 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. 3 U.N. GAOR Res. 217 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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This twofold idea of the fundamental equality of all citizens entails
neither that all citizens are in the grip of the same convictions,
religious or not, nor that all their different convictions are (or that
they should act as if they are) equally correct. For a legislator to
present a religious argument in public political debate is not necessari-
ly for her to assert, imply, or presuppose a denial of the fundamental
equality of all citizens. (This is not to deny that one of her convic-
tions, religious or not-for example, the conviction that only white
persons are entitled to vote-may itself assert, imply, or presuppose
a denial of the fundamental equality of all citizens.)
According to Greenawalt, "When legislators speak on political
issues, they represent all their constituents. Their explicit reliance on
any controversial religious or comprehensive view would be inappro-
priate."53 Yes, legislators should represent all their constituents. But
the sense in which they should do so is that in making political
choices, legislators should be concerned with the good or well-being
of all their constituents. Indeed, ideally a legislator should aim, to the
extent possible, at the good of every member of the political commun-
ity, rather than at the good merely of some members-or, worse, at
the good merely of the legislator herself.54 That is the real sense in
which legislators should represent all their constituents. It is not
necessarily inconsistent with the duty of legislators to represent all
their constituents for a legislator, in speaking on political issues, to
invoke a "controversial religious or other comprehensive view"-for
example, a religious belief about what is truly good for every member
of the community.5
Moreover, it is virtually axiomatic that in a liberal democratic
society the truthful disclosure of all the reasons why one's representa-
tive is inclined to stand where she does is an overriding, if infrequent-
ly honored, value. I suspect that most of us citizens of a liberal
53. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 7, at 157.
54. Of course, it may happen to be the case, in a particular situation, that the best way
to aim at the good of all is to attend to the needs, and therefore to the good, of some:
Perhaps in a particular situation satisfying the needs of some is instrumentally related to
achieving the good of all; or perhaps the needs of some are especially severe or have too
long been neglected.
55. Cf. Edmund Burke, From a Speech to the Electors of Bristol; on his being declared
by the Sheriffs duly elected (3 November 1774), in EDMUND BURKE: ON GOVERNMENT,
POLITICS, AND SocIETY 157 (B. Hill ed., 1975): "Your representative owes you, not his
industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it
to your opinion."
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democracy would be more than willing to endure some feeling of
being "imposed upon" if that were the price for knowing all the
reasons why our representatives stand where they do. Among other
things, if we know all the reasons, we can respond more effective-
ly-especially when our representatives are up for reelection-than if
we know only some of them.
Especially because the truthful disclosure of all the reasons why
an elected official stands where she does is an overriding value, a
much more sensible way to minimize the extent to which some
citizens might "feel imposed upon in the sense of being exclud-
ed' 6 -a much more proportionate way to minimize "the inequality
and disrespect that members of minorities may feel ... , the sense
that they are being imposed upon as second class citizens" 57-is for
a legislator to feature, in public political debate, not only all the
relevant arguments that she takes seriously, including religious
arguments, but all the credible and not otherwise inappropriate
arguments that might incline a citizen to support the political choice
at issue. In that way, a legislator does not conceal the real bases of
her support, but neither does she gratuitously marginalize or exclude
reasons that may appeal to some of her constituents or to some
citizens generally; instead, she "re-presents" all the relevant reasons,
both those that are most important to her and those that might be
most important to someone else. She thereby cultivates the bonds of
political community even as she forthrightly indicates why she stands
where she does. Obviously, strategic considerations should give any
elected official ample incentive to do just what I recommend here.
Greenawalt's second basic reason for concluding that legislators
should not present religious arguments in public political debate
presupposes his first: Because a legislator's presentation of a religious
argument will make citizens who reject the belief "feel imposed upon
in the sense of being excluded," the position that legislators may
present such arguments in public political debate "underestimates the
harm of a religious politics in the present United States."58
Greenawalt allows that "[fintense religious politics in the United
States probably would not produce extensive outright violence, but we
are still far from harmonious mutual respect and tolerance. Religious
divisions are still very significant in many regions, and people are
56. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 7, at 157.
57. Id. at 132.
58. Id at 158.
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acutely conscious of whether they are in a majority or minority.' ' 9
Greenawalt's estimate of the likely "harm of a religious politics in the
United States" is exaggerated. However one evaluates the phenome-
non, religion has been, for the most part, domesticated in western
liberal democratic societies.' As Greenawalt himself emphasizes,
"There is a long history of religious involvement in politics in the
United States, and most crucial facts are beyond dispute."'" One
crucial fact, beyond dispute, is that notwithstanding that long history
of religious involvement in politics in the United States, the sky has
not fallen. Indeed, "the risk of major instability generated by relig-
ious conflict is minimal. Conditions in modem democracies may be
so far from the conditions that gave raise [sic] to the religious wars of
the sixteenth century that we no longer need worry about religious
divisiveness as a source of substantial social conflict."'6 Moreover,
even if legislators may present religious arguments in public political
debate, the fact remains that in a religiously pluralistic society like the
United States, strategic considerations give politicians a powerful
incentive to feature-to give pride of place to-secular arguments, if
not indeed to present only secular arguments. All the more reason,
then, why Greenawalt's fears about what will ensue if we countenance
legislators presenting religious arguments in public political debate
seem exaggerated: That they may feature such arguments does not
mean that they will do so very often.
Note, too, that Greenawalt accepts David Hollenbach's argument
that, quite apart from public argument specifically about political
issues, there is an important place for religious discourse in the public
culture of the United States.' Indeed, Greenawalt recommends that
elected officials [do not] actually conceal the most funda-
mental grounds of their convictions, either when in office or
running for office. In this respect, I think Jimmy Carter was
59. I& at 157; see also id. at 130-31: "Although religious violence is now rare [in the
United States], we are not yet close to a state of bland tolerance."
60. See Maimon Schwarzschild, Religion and Public Debate in a Liberal Society:
Always Oil and Water or Sometimes More Like Rum and Coca-Cola?, 30 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 903 (1993).
61. GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 7, at 166.
62. Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1083, 1096 (1990).
Solum is stating the argument, not making it. Indeed, Solum is wary of the argument. See
id. at 1096-97. Solum cites Stephen L. Carter as an example of the argument. Id. at 936
n.15 (citing Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a
Hobby, 1987 DuKE L.J. 977). For another instance, see Schwarzschild, supra note 60.
63. See GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 7, at 152.
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an apt example. In contrast to John Kennedy, he did not
assert that his religious beliefs were irrelevant to his political
functioning, and he made clear his deep Protestant evangeli-
cal beliefs.'
It is difficult to understand, then, why Greenawalt believes that
an elected official's presentation of a religious argument in public
political debate poses dangers not already posed-why, for example,
it makes one who rejects the religious premise (or premises) of the
argument feel more "imposed upon in the sense of being excluded"
than she already does (if she does)-given that, if Greenawalt's
recommendation is being followed, the official's embrace of the
religious premise comes as no surprise to anyone.
Neither of Greenawalt's two principal arguments against
legislators presenting religious arguments in public political debate is
persuasive. Greenawalt also argues that the presentation of religious
arguments by legislators will not contribute much if anything to the
deliberative quality of public political debate." But, as I explained
in the preceding section, secular arguments do not always fare better
than religious arguments in that regard. It seems doubtful, in any
event, that the airing of religious arguments by legislators is likely to
so compromise the existing dialogic quality of public political
debate-which, of course, is already often depressingly low-that we
should want our representatives to be less than fully forthcoming
about why they stand where they do.66 Because our representatives
64. Ik at 158.
65. See id at 157.
66. In correspondence, Gerry Whyte of the Trinity College School of Law in Dublin,
Ireland, has written:
Taking the example of abortion, if I oppose abortion for religious reasons ...
then unless I can publicly declare those reasons, I will not be able to defend my
stance from allegations that I am, say, misogynist. (Divorce, in the Irish context,
would probably be another good example of this point.) In other words, even
where my religious beliefs cannot persuade my interlocutor to change his/her
views, still I must be allowed to cite them if only to establish the bona fide
nature of my motives. I think that this is important because one can still respect
the sincerity of the fundamentalist (and pay his/her argument certain dues as a
result) even if at the end of the day the argument is not persuasive; however one
would have no time at all for the person whose motives are known to be less
than honest.
Letter from Gerry Whyte to Michael J. Perry (July 12, 1994) (on file with the author).
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should be fully forthcoming about why they stand where they do, and
for the other reasons presented in this Essay, we should encourage
the airing of religious arguments, even by legislators, in public polit-
ical debate about the morality of human conduct.
If the better view is that legislators-who, after all, represent many citizens other
than just themselves-may present religious arguments in public political debate, afortiori
citizens-who represent only themselves-may present such arguments. (To say that
citizens represent just themselves is not to say that citizens, in making political choices,
should aim to secure merely what they believe to be good for them; as an ideal matter,
they should aim to secure what they believe to be the common good. See PERRY, CONSTI-
TUTION IN THE COURTS, supra note 11, at 104-05. Of course, they may understandably
believe-and in some cases they may even quite plausibly believe-that what is good for
them, or good for them especially, is also in the common good.) Greenawalt, whose view
is that legislators should not present religious arguments in public political debate, is more
permissive for ordinary citizens than for legislators. He writes that in making arguments
in support of political choices in the small settings in which they typically express them-
selves, ordinary citizens may rely, inter alia, on their religious beliefs. "Most citizens never
get involved in advocacy of political positions, beyond talking to family, close friends, and
associates. In those personal settings, people should feel free to express their reliance on
any grounds they find compelling .. " GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra
note 7, at 160. That Greenawalt's position is more permissive for ordinary citizens than
for legislators is an instance of an instinct on the part of many persons to think that, with
respect to making political choices or making public arguments in support of political
choices or both, what is legitimate for citizens to do, because they represent only
themselves, is not necessarily legitimate for legislators to do, because they represent many
citizens. I agree with Jeremy Waldron, however, that, with respect to the'matters under
discussion here, it is a mistake to distinguish between what citizens may do and what their
representatives may do. At least, it is a mistake to draw the distinction too sharply, or to
put much weight on the distinction. See Waldron, supra note 43, at 827-31; see also
Tushnet, supra note 20, at 199-201 (arguing that it does not make sense to distinguish
between the grounds on which citizens may rely, in making political choices, and the
grounds on which their elected representatives may rely). Although Greenawalt's position
is permissive for ordinary citizens, it is not permissive for those whom Greenawalt calls
"quasi-public citizens": media commentators, newspaper editors, presidents of large
corporations, etc. According to Greenawalt, quasi-public citizens, like legislators, should
avoid presenting religious arguments in public political debate. See GREENAWALT,
PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 7, at 160-61. "One class of quasi-public citizens falls
outside my conclusions here: those whose profession (chosen by others or self-chosen) is
to speak from religious and other comprehensive perspectives." Id. at 161. I have
indicated why I think Greenawalt is wrong to ask legislators to forgo presenting religious
arguments in public political debate. If I am right about that, a fortiori Greenawalt is
wrong in asking quasi-public citizens to forgo presenting religious arguments in public
political debate. This is not to deny that such citizens, like legislators, often have strategic
reasons for featuring, in their public political advocacy, secular reasons. But that
legislators and others often have strategic reasons for downplaying religious reasons does
not mean that they should forgo presenting religious arguments in public political debate
if they want to do so. (In addition to citizens and legislators, Greenawalt discusses judges.
I comment on that aspect of Greenawalt's position in the larger work from which this
Essay is drawn.)
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IV. RAWLS'S "IDEAL OF PUBLIC REASON"
Because it represents a prominent and influential position dif-
ferent from the one I have defended in this Essay, I now want to
examine "the idea of public reason" John Rawls has espoused in his
book, Political Liberalism.67 The idea of public reason-or, as Rawls
often puts it, "the ideal of public reason"---is meant by Rawls to
regulate, to govern, certain aspects of the politics of a society, like the
United States, committed to political liberalism. In Rawls's view, the
ideal of public reason is a constituent of political liberalism, and a
commitment to the latter should therefore include a commitment to
the former.
69
The important distinction for Rawls is not between religious
beliefs or reasons and secular reasons, but between public reasons and
nonpublic reasons:
[T]here are many nonpublic reasons .... Among the non-
public reasons are those of associations of all kinds: chur-
ches and universities, scientific societies and professional
67. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 222-54 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1993]; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public
Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729 (1993) [hereinafter Solum, Constructing an Ideal].
In his new introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, Rawls has
revised his earlier discussion of the idea of public reason. In particular, Rawls writes:
When engaged in public reasoning may we also include reasons of our compre-
hensive doctrines? I now believe ... that reasonable [sic] such doctrines may
be introduced in public reason at any time, provided that in due course public
reasons, given by a reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to
support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support. I refer
to this as the provision and it specifies what I now call the wide view of public
reason.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (paperback ed. forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
1996]. Then, in a footnote, Rawls says:
[M]any questions need to be considered in applying the proviso. One is, when
does it need to be satisfied, on the same day or on some later day? Also, on
whom does the obligation to honor it fall? There are many such questions, I
only indicate a few of them here. The point is that it ought to be clear and
established how the proviso is to be appropriately satisfied.
lId
68. See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1993, supra note 67, at 215 (emphasis
added).
69. Rawls's principal aim, however, is not to recommend a regime that the law should
impose, but only a regime that citizens and public officials should impose on themselves.
As with Kent Greenawalt, Rawls's aim is to recommend an informal arrangement for the
United States and for relevantly similar societies; it is to recommend that a certain under-
standing, that certain expectations, be established in the political culture of such a society.
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groups.... [T]o act reasonably and responsibly, corporate
bodies, as well as individuals, need a way of reasoning about
what is to be done. This way of reasoning is public with
respect to their members, but nonpublic with respect to
political society and to citizens generally. Nonpublic reasons
comprise the many reasons of civil society and belong to
what I have called the "background culture," in contrast with
the public political culture.'
Although, then, religious reasons are not, for Rawls, the only non-
public reasons, they are a paradigmatic example of nonpublic reasons.
In limiting the political role of nonpublic reasons, Rawls's ideal of
public reason limits the political role of religious reasons (among
other nonpublic reasons).
Rawls means the ideal to govern not "all political questions but
only to those involving what we may call 'constitutional essentials' and
questions of basic justice."71  Rawls gives, as examples of "such
fundamental questions," "who has the right to vote, or what religions
are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportuni-
ty, or to hold property. These and similar questions are the special
subject of public reason."72 However, Rawls limits the jurisdiction
of the ideal of public reason to such questions only provisionally,
mainly as a matter of argumentative strategy:
[M]y aim is to consider first the strongest case where the
political questions concern the most fundamental matters.
If we should not honor the limits of public reason here, it
would seem we need not honor them anywhere. Should
they hold here, we can then proceed to other cases. Still, I
grant that it is usually highly desirable to settle political
questions by invoking the values of public reason7
I shall discuss the ideal of public reason, therefore, as if it applied
to political questions beyond just "'constitutional essentials' and
questions of basic justice." (Larry Solum, who is sympathetic to
Rawls's project, has argued that the ideal of public reason should not
70. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1993, supra note 67, at 220. Rawls adds: "These
reasons are social, and certainly not private." Id. Then, in a footnote, he says: "The
public vs. nonpublic distinction is not the distinction between public and private. This
latter I ignore: there is no such thing as private reason." Id at 220 n.7.
71. Id at 214.
72. Id
73. Id. at 215. Rawls adds: "Yet this may not always be so." Id
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be limited to the resolution of what Rawls calls "political questions
concern[ing] the most fundamental matters," but should "extend...
to all coercive uses of state power."7 4)
Rawls means the ideal of public reason to govern not only the
elected representatives of the people (and judges),75 but all citi-
zens.76 According to the ideal, neither citizens nor their representa-
tives should make a political choice unless it can be justified on the
basis of public reasons, and the public justification of a political choice
should be on the basis of public reasons." My principal concern in
this Essay is the role of religious arguments in public political debate.
(In the larger work from which this Essay is drawn, I turn to the
question of the role of such arguments as basis of political choice.)
Nonetheless, because Rawls means the ideal of public reason to
govern the making as well as the public justification of political
choices, I comment here on the ideal as it applies both to the making
of and to the public justification of political choices.
74. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, supra note 67, at 738-39; cf.
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES, supra note 7, at 117-20 (arguing that Rawls's
two-track approach-public reason for political questions that concern "the most funda-
mental matters" but not for other political questions-gives rise to "[s]erious technical
problems... [that] raise[] further doubt about the theoretical defensibility of his position
and about the feasibility of its practical application").
75. 1 comment on Rawls's position with respect to judges in the larger work from
which this Essay is drawn. See PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS, supra note 17.
76. See supra note 62.
77. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1993, supra note 67, at 215-16:
Another feature of public reason is that its limits do not apply to our personal
deliberations and reflections about political questions, or to the reasoning about
them by members of associations such as churches and universities, all of which
is a vital part of the background culture. Plainly, religious, philosophical, and
moral considerations of many kinds may here properly play a role. But the ideal
of public reason does hold for citizens when they engage in political advocacy
in the public forum, and thus for members of political parties and for candidates
in their campaigns and for other groups who support them. It holds equally for
how citizens are to vote in elections when constitutional essentials and matters
of basic justice are at stake. Thus, the ideal of public reason not only governs
the public discourse of elections insofar as the issues involve those fundamental
questions, but also how citizens are to cast their vote on these questions.
Otherwise, public discourse runs the risks of being hypocritical: citizens talk
before one another one way and vote another.
... [T]he ideal of public reason ... applies in official forums and so to
legislators when they speak on the floor of parliament, and to the executive in
its piblic acts and pronouncements.
Rawls adds that the ideal of public reason "applies ... in a special way to the judiciary
and above all to a supreme court in a constitutional democracy with judicial review." Id.
at 216.
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Of course, Rawls means for the ideal of public reason to
constrain citizens and their representatives, both in making and in
publicly justifying political choices, to rely on public, rather than on
nonpublic, reasons. But what, according to Rawls, are public reasons?
Although Rawls does not distinguish between normative and non-
normative reasons in developing the ideal of public reason, it is, I
think, useful to do so. Nonnormative reasons or premises are claims
of fact, claims about the way things are (or were, or will be).
Normative premises are claims of value, claims about the way things
should be. (Although many religious premises are normative, many
others are nonnormative; many religious premises are claims about
the ways things are.) With respect to nonnormative premises, public
reasons are "the plain truths now widely accepted, or available, to
citizens generally."7 Rawls includes here the "conclusions of science
when these are not controversial."79  With respect to normative
premises, public reasons are "the ideals and principles expressed by
society's conception of political justice."8" Finally, public reasons
include "guidelines of inquiry: principles of reasoning and rules of
evidence in the light of which citizens are to decide whether substan-
tive principles properly apply and to identify laws and policies that
best satisfy them."'" Rawls mentions, in particular, "forms of
reasoning found in common sense, and the methods ... of science
when these are not controversial."'  Rawls does not suppose-and
it is obviously not the case-that a consensus has been achieved in the
United States about what the constituents of a conception of political
justice are. What does Rawls mean, then, by saying that (on the
normative side) public reasons are limited to "the ideals and
principles expressed by society's conception of political justice?"
The point of the ideal of public reason is that citizens are to
conduct their fundamental discussions within the framework
78. I& at 225.
79. Id at 224.
80. Id at 213; see also id at 169 ("political values expressed by the political conception
[of justice] endorsed by the overlapping consensus").
81. 1& at 224.
Now it is essential that a liberal political conception include, besides its principles
of justice, guidelines of inquiry that specify ways of reasoning and criteria for the
kinds of information relevant for political questions. Without such guidelines
substantive principles cannot be applied and this leaves the political conception
incomplete and fragmentary.
Id at 223-24.
82. Id at 224.
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of what each regards as a political conception of justice
based on values that the others can reasonably be expected
to endorse and each is, in good faith, prepared to defend
that conception so understood. This means that each of us
must have, and be ready to explain, a criterion of what prin-
ciples and guidelines we think other citizens (who are also
free and equal) may reasonably be expected to endorse
along with us. We must have some test we are ready to
state as to when this condition is met....
Of course, we may find that actually others fail to
endorse the principles and guidelines our criterion selects.
That is to be expected. The idea is that we must have such
a criterion and this alone already imposes very considerable
discipline on public discussion. Not any value is reasonably
said to meet this test, or to be a political value; and not any
balance of political values is reasonable. It is inevitable and
often desirable that citizens have different views as to the
most appropriate political conception [of justice]; for the
public political culture is bound to contain different funda-
mental ideas that can be developed in different ways. An
orderly contest between them over time is a reliable way to
find which one, if any, is most reasonable. 3
Rawls's point, then, seems to be this. The ideal of public reason
constrains a citizen to rely on, on the nonnormative side, only "the
plain truths now widely accepted, or available, to citizens general-
ly"'  and, on the normative side, only those normative premises
(ideals, principles, values) that are part of a conception of political
justice that (1) she reasonably believes other (free and equal) citizens
reasonably could accept and (2) she is prepared to defend to other
citizens as one they reasonably could accept.85 (The ideal of public
reason also constrains a citizen to accept certain "guidelines of inquiry
83. let at 226-27.
84. Id. at 225.
85. In the introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, Rawls writes:
Note that 'reasonably' [sic] occurs at both ends in this formulation: in offering
fair terms we must reasonably think that citizens offered them might also
reasonably accept them. And they must be able to do this as free and equal,
and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior
political or social position.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1996, supra note 67.
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... [e.g.,] forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the
methods.., of science when these are not controversial.")
6
It seems quite uncontroversial that if a citizen can justify a
political choice on the basis of premises, normative or nonnormative
or both, that she believes other citizens reasonably could accept and
that she is prepared to defend to them as premises they could accept,
she should do so. Strategically, she is much better off doing so than
relying on premises she believes other citizens could not accept.
Morally, she is much better off doing so, in this sense: She cultivates
rather than subverts the bonds of political community (or, as Rawls
prefers, "social unity"' ) by relying on premises that in her view
unite, or could unite, the citizenry rather than on premises that divide
them. (I have discussed the nature of political community, under-
stood as a "community of judgment," elsewhere-and I have
explained why political community, thus understood, is a good."8 )
But, of course, it is not necessarily the case that a citizen can
justify a political choice she wants to make-and perhaps even
believes herself morally obligated to make-on the basis of premises
that she believes other citizens could reasonably accept (and that she
is prepared to defend to them as premises they could accept): The
relevant premises (that she believes other citizens could reasonably
accept) may be indeterminate (or, more precisely, underdeter-
minate89); they may well be inconclusive with respect to the issue at
hand. What is she to do when the relevant premises-and therefore
the political conception of justice they constitute-are indeterminate?
If Rawls believes that such indeterminacy is a marginal reality and
therefore a minor problem, as in a recent writing he suggests," he
86. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1993, supra note 67, at 224.
87. Id. at 133-72.
88. See PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 3, at 83-127.
89. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 462 (1987).
90. In the new introduction of the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, Rawls
writes:
One objection to the wide view of public reason is that it is still too restrictive.
However, to establish this, we must find pressing questions of constitutional
essentials or matters of basic justice that cannot reasonably be resolved by
political values expressed by any of the existing reasonable political conceptions,
nor also by any such conceptions that could beworked out. Political Liberalism
doesn't argue that this can never happen; it only suggests that it rarely does so.
Whether public reason can settle all, or almost all, political questions by a
reasonable ordering of political values cannot be decided in the abstract
independent of actual cases.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1996, supra note 67.
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is simply wrong. As American constitutional materials powerfully
confirm, the underdeterminacy of some of our political-moral norms
is a central reality.9' In his Presidential Address to the American
Philosophical Association, Philip Quinn has emphasized, with partic-
ular reference to the matter of abortion, the problem of indetermina-
cy that confronts Rawls's ideal of public reason.'
But even if for the sake of argument we put aside the problem
of indeterminacy, which is a substantial problem for Rawls's position,
this more fundamental question remains: If the premises that a
citizen believes other citizens could reasonably accept (and that she
is prepared to defend to them as premises they could accept) do not
support a political choice she wants to make, why shouldn't she
defend the choice-and make it-on the basis of nonpublic premises
that in her view do support the choice? Imagine, for example, that
because of one or more of her religious beliefs-which, for Rawls, are
nonpublic reasons-a citizen is convinced that a political choice is the
right political choice, the correct one, but that she also believes
(perhaps mistakenly) that the choice is not one she can justify on the
basis of public reasons. (Religious premises may be nonnorm-
ative-they may be beliefs about the ways things are-as well as
normative.) Why should she acquiesce in Rawls's view that the ideal
of public reason trumps what she is convinced to be the right political
choice? Or, as Rawls himself has an imaginary interlocutor state the
question:
[W]hy should citizens in discussing and voting on the most
fundamental political questions honor the limits of public
reason? How can it be either reasonable or rational, when
basic matters are at stake, for citizens to appeal only to a
public conception of justice and not to the whole truth as
they see it? Surely, the most fundamental questions should
be settled by appealing to the most important truths, yet
these may far transcend public reason!93
Rawls responds to this, the most fundamental question we can
ask about his ideal of public reason, by invoking what he calls "the
liberal principle of legitimacy," according to which not even a
91. I have discussed this state of affairs-and how the judiciary should respond to it-
elsewhere. See generally PERRY, CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS, supra note 11, at 70-115.
92. See Philip L. Quinn, Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious,
69 PROC. & ADDRESSES OF THE AM. PHIL. ASS'N. 35, 40-46 (1995).
93. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1993, supra note 67, at 216.
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majority of citizens may exercise coercive political power over any
citizen unless a premise or premises that the citizen, understood as
free and equal, could reasonably accept supports the majority's doing
SO.
[W]hen may citizens by their vote properly exercise their
coercive political power over one another when fundamental
questions are at stake? Or in the light of what principles
and ideals must we exercise that power if our doing so is to
be justifiable to others [understood] as free and equal
[citizens]? To this question political liberalism replies: our
exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable
only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution
the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals
acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. This is the
liberal principle of legitimacy. And since the exercise of
political power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of citizen-
ship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty-the duty of civili-
ty-to be able to explain to one another on those fundamen-
tal questions how the principles and policies they advocate
and vote for can be supported by the political values of
public reason.94
The problem with this response-a conspicuous problem, in my
view-is that it is question-begging: Rawls's answer presupposes the
authority of that which is at issue. The question why a majority of
citizens (we are talking about a democracy, after all) should abandon
the coercive political choice they believe they should otherwise make
just because, in their view, no premise that other citizens could
(reasonably) accept supports the choice is the question why a majority
of citizens may exercise coercive political power over a citizen only if
a premise or premises that they believe the citizen (understood as free
and equal) could accept supports the majority's doing so. It remains
obscure why we do not show others the respect that is their due as
human beings or, at least, as "free and equal citizens" when we offer
them, in explanation, what we take to be our best reasons for acting
as we do (so long as our reasons do not themselves assert, imply, or
presuppose the inferior humanity of those to whom the explanation
94. Id. at 217. Rawls adds: "This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others
and a fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably
be made." Id.
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is offered).95 According to Robert Audi, "If you are fully rational
and I cannot convince you of my view by arguments framed in the
concepts we share as rational beings, then even if mine is the majority
view I should not coerce you."96 But why?
There is a gap between a premise which requires the state to
show equal concern and respect for all its citizens and a
conclusion which rules out as legitimate grounds for coercion
the fact that a majority believes that conduct is immoral,
wicked, or wrong. That gap has yet to be closed. 7
Merely invoking "the liberal principle of legitimacy" as if it were
an axiom of American political morality does not advance the
discussion; it does not close the gap. Invoking the principle without
defending it will work only for those who already accept the principle.
Invoking the principle without defending it does not tell anyone who
does not already accept the principle why she should accept it; it does
not give anyone reasons, public or otherwise, for accepting it.
The point is not that if a citizen can explain a political choice she
wants to make on the basis of premises she believes other citizens
could accept, or could reasonably accept, she should not do so. To
the contrary, she should do so. We have reasons-both a strategic
reason and a moral one-for that position, as I indicated a few
paragraphs back. What we do not yet have are reasons-what Rawls
has not given us is an argument-for a different position: the position
that if no premises that a citizen believes other free and equal citizens
95. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVER-
SITy IN THE LIBERAL STATE 108-09 (1991). Commenting critically on Rawls's Political
Liberalism, Michael Sandel has observed:
On the liberal conception [of mutual respect], we respect our fellow citizens'
moral and religious convictions by ignoring them (for political purposes), by
leaving them undisturbed, or by carrying on political debate without reference
to them. To admit moral and religious ideals into political debate about justice
would undermine mutual respect in this sense.
Sandel, supra note 43, at 1794. Sandel then remarks:
[T]his is not the only, or perhaps even the most plausible way of understanding
the mutual respect on which democratic citizenship depends. On a different
conception of respect ... we respect our fellow citizen's moral and religious
convictions by engaging, or attending to them-sometimes by challenging and
contesting them, sometimes by listening and learning from them-especially if
those convictions bear on important political questions.
Id.
96. Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society,
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 701 (1993).
97. Gerald Dworkin, Equal Respect and the Enforcement of Morality, 7 Soc. PHIL. &
POL'Y 180, 193 (1990).
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could reasonably accept, and that she is prepared to defend them as
premises they could reasonably accept, support a political choice she
wants to make, she should abandon the choice. We need an (non-
question-begging) argument for the position that "when basic matters
are at stake," a citizen should "appeal only to a public conception of
justice and not to the whole truth as they see it." Surely the presum-
ption must be (until Rawls or someone else develops an argument
rebutting the presumption) that even "the most fundamental questions
should be settled by appealing to the most important truths, [which]
may far transcend public reason.""8 Commenting on Rawls's ideal
of public reason, John Langan has written:
[I]t is ... important for [religious groups in a pluralistic
society] to retain a certain transcendence in relation to any
specific constitutional system, a transcendence which will
enable them to protest the atrocities and idolatries of which
states have always been capable. To place an idealized form
of state over admittedly imperfect communities of faith in
our determination of the range of acceptable moral consider-
ations seems to me to be both dangerous and unfaithful, and
it is at best a dubious contribution to civic peace."
We can all agree, surely, that it is good to cultivate the bonds of
political community; it is good to promote what Rawls calls "social
unity." But contrary to what Rawls seems to presuppose, social unity
is not all-or-nothing; it is more-or-less. The serious inquiry, as
Langan's comment suggests, is this: How much social unity-and at
what cost or costs? What ift in the view of some citizens-for exam-
ple, those on the "pro-life" side in the abortion controversy-the lives
of innocent human beings hang in the balance? Does Rawls really
believe that such citizens should prize an incremental addition to
social unity over innocent human life?"° Instead of Rawls's seem-
98. See Timothy P. Jackson, Love in a Liberal Society: A Response to Paul J.
Weithman, 22 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 29 (1994).
99. John Langan, S.J., Overcoming the Divisiveness of Religion: A Response to Paul
J. Weithman, 22 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 47, 51 (1994); cf. Paul F. Campos, Secular Fund-
amentalism, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1814 (1994).
100. See Sandel, supra note 43, at 1776-77:
Where grave moral questions are concerned, whether it is reasonable to bracket
moral and religious controversies for the sake of political agreement partly
depends on which of the contending moral or religious doctrines is true.
.[E]ven granting the importance of securing social cooperation on the
basis of mutual respect, what is to guarantee that this interest is always so
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ingly either/or approach, why not a more nuanced, middle position,
according to which, in the interest of promoting social unity, of
cultivating rather than subverting the bonds of political community,
we try to justify political choices we want to make, as much as
possible, on the basis of political "ideals, principles and values that we
may reasonably suppose all citizens could accept"-but according to
which we do not invariably let the inability of a political choice to be
justified on such a basis preclude us from making the choice, or from
publicly supporting it, on the basis of what we take to be our best
reasons, even though, alas, they are what Rawls terms "nonpublic?"
Moreover, given the intractable problem of indeterminacy
mentioned earlier, following the path of public reason does not always
lead to one and only one position on a contested issue. With respect
to many contested issues, it will be necessary, after following the path
of public reason to the end, to go on from there on the basis of one
or more nonpublic reasons, whether religious or nonreligious
(secular). Rawls believes that the abortion controversy-the question
of what public policy regarding abortion ought to be-should be
resolved according to the ideal of public reason.' (That the
abortion controversy presents the sort of fundamental political issue
Rawls means to be resolved according to the ideal of public reason is
obvious. At the heart of the abortion controversy, after all, is a fund-
amental-perhaps the fundamental-political issue: Who is a subject
of justice?"~) But the ideal of public reason is conspicuously
indeterminate (underdeterminate) with respect to the abortion contro-
versy. This is reflected by the fact that many persons on both sides
of the controversy-many persons who are "pro-life" and many
important as to outweigh any competing interest that could arise from within a
comprehensive moral or religious view?
101. See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1996, supra note 67.
102. Robert George has written: "Opponents of abortion.., view all human beings,
including the unborn ... as members of the community of subjects to whom duties in
justice are owed .... The real issue of principle between supporters of abortion ... and
opponents ... has to do with the question of who are subjects of justice." Robert P.
George, Book Review, 88 AM. POL. Sl. REV. 444, 445 (1994) (reviewing RONALD
DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993)). In George's view, "The challenge to the orthodox liberal
view of abortion ... is to identify nonarbitrary grounds for holding that the unborn ...
do not qualify as subjects of justice." Id George adds: "Frankly, I doubt that this
challenge can be met. In any event, Dworkin here fails to make much progress toward
meeting it." Id. at 446; cf. Mary Warnock, The Limits of Toleration, in ON TOLERATION
123, 125 (Susan Mendus & David Edwards eds., 1987) (commenting on John Stuart Mill's
failure to address, inter alia, the question "Who is to count as a possible object of harm?").
RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS
persons who are "pro-choice"-affirm these two relevant, fundamen-
tal "public" values: the great worth of human life and the full and
therefore equal humanity of women. With respect to the abortion
controversy, it is necessary, after following the ideal of public reason
to the end, to go on from there on the basis of one or more nonpublic
reasons. Some citizens believe that all human life, including unborn
human life, is sacred. What would Rawls have the citizen do who
sincerely believes that innocent lives hang in the balance? It bears
emphasis here that following the path of public reason does not lead,
without the intervention of nonpublic reasons, to the "pro-choice"
position in the abortion controversy any more than it leads to the
"pro-life" position. The path of public reason runs out before the
"pro-choice" position is reached. 3 Reliance partly on a nonpublic
reason or reasons, whether religious or secular, is necessary for those
on the "pro-choice" side of the debate no less than for those on the
"pro-life" side: for example, "A human fetus is not a 'person' and
therefore does not have the rights that persons have."
103. See Quinn, supra note 92 at 40-46. A default position in favor of a noncoercive
public policy is deeply problematic. See PERRY, LOvE AND POWER, supra note 3, at 13-14.
In the new introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, Rawls seems
to think that the abortion controversy sometimes exemplifies (whatever else it exemplifies)
not the problem of the underdeterminacy of public reason but rather a "stand-off'
between two competing arguments, one of them "pro-life" and the other "pro-choice,"
each of which is consistent with public reason. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
1996, supra note 67).
However, disputed questions, such as that of abortion, may lead to a stand-
off between political conceptions and citizens must simply vote on the question.
Indeed, this is the normal case: unanimity of views is not to be expected.
Reasonable political conceptions do not always lead to the same conclusion; nor
do citizens holding the same coception [sic] always agree on particular issues.
Yet the outcome of the vote is to be seen as reasonable provided all citizens of
a reasonably just constitutional regime sincerely vote in accordance with the idea
of public reason. This doesn't mean the outcome is true or correct, but it is for
the moment reasonable, and binding on citizens by the majority principle. Some
may, of course, reject a decision, as Catholics may reject a decision to grant a
right to abortion. They may present an argument in public reason for denying
it and fail to win a majority. But they need not exercise the right of abortion in
their own case. They can recognize the right as belonging to legitimate law and
therefore do not resist it with force.
Id. As I have suggested in the text accompanying this note, however, the problem is not
that (which Rawls calls "the normal case") of a "stand-off' between two arguments, each
of which is consistent with the ideal of public reason. The problem, rather, is that of the
underdeterminacy of public reason with respect to the policy issue of abortion. See supra
text accompanying note 92.
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Because of the role that religious arguments about the morality
of human conduct inevitably play in the political process, it is impor-
tant that such arguments, no less than secular moral arguments, be
presented in-so that they can be tested in-public political debate.
Moreover, it is impossible to construct "an airtight barrier" between,
on the one side, public culture generally-in which religiously based
moral discourse is undeniably proper-and, on the other, public
debate specifically about controversial political issues. Because Kent
Greenawalt and John Rawls have each defended a position less
congenial to the airing of religious arguments in public political
debate than the position-the inclusivist position-I have defended in
this Essay, I have detailed here what I take to be the inadequacies
both of the arguments Greenawalt gives for his position and of those
Rawls gives for his.
